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Do all men wish to do well? Or is this question one of the
ridiculous ones I was afraid of just now? I suppose it is stupid
even to raise such a question, since there could hardly be aman
who would not wish to do well.
(P, Euthydemus   –)
N  has done more than Julia Annas to reintroduce ancient
Greek eudaimonism into philosophical thought and discourse.
Annas has (for good reason) focused on eudaimonism’s normative
work. The protreptic passage in Euthydemus which our epigraph
begins, for example, is dedicated to establishing the conclusion
that we should all seek ‘good sense and wisdom’ if we wish to
live and do well. What has received less attention is the kind of
premiss to which Plato has helped himself here. He has Socrates
make, rather casually, a bold and surprising descriptive claim, about
the psychological—more speciﬁcally motivational—economies of
human beings, asserting that within each such economy there is a
powerful desire to live well. The argumentative context of these
protreptic passages makes it clear that Plato thinks, not only that
nobody lacks this desire, but also that this desire can reliably be
©Mark LeBar and Nathaniel Goldberg 
We are grateful for comments and discussion from participants in the th Annual
Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, including and especially Rachel Sing-
purwalla, our colloquium commentator, and Julia Annas, who ﬁrst made us think
about psychological eudaimonism in the context of ancient ethics. We are also grate-
ful for comments and discussion from Robert Briscoe, Jeremy Morris, Alan Picha-
nick, James Petrik, Matthew Rellihan, Daniel Russell, Lad Sessions, Angela Smith,
Florentien Verhage, and Tad Zawidzki. Finally, we would like to thank Washington
and Lee University for awarding Goldberg a Lenfest Summer Grant to support this
research.
 Trans. R. K. Sprague, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis
and Cambridge, ). All quotations from Plato come from this volume. See also
Euthyd.  .
 Euthyd.   –  . ‘Do well’ translates eu prattein, which, like eu zēn (lit.
‘live well’), is used as a synonym for eudaimonia, as the context makes clear.
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counted on (when accompanied by correct beliefs about the role
of morality or virtue in living well) to move people to seek ‘good
sense and wisdom’—to be virtuous. Call the claim that this desire
is found universally in human psychology, with this sort of domi-
nating motivational force, ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’).
PE appears not only in Plato but also in Aristotle and the Stoics.
Nevertheless, we might wonder about it in two ways. First, we
might wonder about its warrant. Though universal in scope, the
claim concerns an apparently contingent feature of the motivational
propensities of individual human organisms. What grounds could
the ancients have for their conﬁdence that there are no outliers?
Second, we might wonder about PE’s relationship to normative eu-
daimonism. By ‘normative eudaimonism’ (‘NE’) we mean the nor-
mative or prescriptive claim that we have conclusive reason to act
in ways that conduce to our own eudaimonia. NE is a claim about
what it is to be rational.
We think both questions can be illuminated by considering
the context of interpersonal interpretation in which ascriptions of
mental states—including the dominant desire to live well—occur.
Considering what is involved in seeing others as rational yields
one essential clue as to why PE must be not only warranted but
also true. Considering how the aspiration to live well contributes
to our rationality yields another such clue. In fact we shall argue
that PE is warranted by the conjunction of two ideas suggested by
what is involved in understanding others as rational generally and
ourselves as practically rational speciﬁcally. We take the former to
be—interestingly and unexpectedly—informed by Donald David-
son’s account of how we interpret others. We take the latter to be
the ancients’ account of NE. If we couple Davidson’s philosophi-
cal strictures on interpretation with the eudaimonist structure of
practical rationality essential to ancient Greek ethics, then PE must
be true.
 We assume that they do not merely misspeak in framing general claims as uni-
versal.
 There are three reasons why bringing Davidson into contact with ancient philo-
sophy is not as strange as it might seem. () Davidson’s undergraduate training was
in classics, and he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on Philebus, which he translated him-
self (Davidson, ‘Intellectual Autobiography of Donald Davidson’, inThe Philosophy
of Donald Davidson [Davidson], ed. L. E. Hahn (La Salle, Ill., ), – at ).
() Though Davidson published in philosophies of action, language, and mind, even
here ancient ideas percolate through. As explained below, he published on akrasia
(‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, in Essays on Actions and Events [Essays],
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section  we provide a textual
basis for ascribing PE to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Sec-
tion  we outline our two-part strategy for defending PE. The ﬁrst
part comes, in Section , from Davidson’s account of interpreta-
tion. The second comes, in Section , from the ancients’ account of
NE. In Sections  and  we consider objections.
. Psychological eudaimonism in ancient ethical theories
Where does PE appear in ancient Greek ethical theories? Our epi-
graph is the foundational premiss for Plato’s argument in Euthy-
demus that we should seek to become wise. It is as clear as any for-
mulation of PE we get in Plato. Similarly, in Symposium Plato treats
the claim that happiness is universally desired as the terminus of a
regress. He has Diotima contend that we want everything else for
the sake of happiness, but there is ‘no need to ask further, “What’s
the point of wanting happiness?”.’ This point matters, as it indi-
cates that, indeterminate as the end under discussion might be (she
and Socrates have not yet agreed on what happiness consists in), it
nevertheless plays a certain functional role in people’s psychologi-
cal economies. It is that for the sake of which they want other good
things: it gives a ‘point’ to seeking them. And, as in Euthydemus,
this desire is thought to be universal. She asks Socrates whether
‘this desire for happiness, this kind of love’ is ‘common to all hu-
man beings’, and whether ‘everyone wants to have good things for
ever and ever’. ‘It is common to all’, he agrees. InMeno the tenet
that nobody wishes to be ‘miserable and unhappy’ grounds an ar-
gument for the value of virtue (  ). And the vexed argument of
nd edn. (NewYork andOxford, ), –). He elsewhere counselled that to ﬁnd
a speaker intelligible, we must consider her ‘a believer of truths, and a lover of the
good’ (‘Mental Events’, ibid. – at ); few statements sound more Platonic.
Davidson even tries reading some of his views on interpretation into Plato (Truth,
Language, and History (Oxford, ), essays –). () Davidson and the ancients
both share a methodological commitment to the primacy of the ﬁrst-personal agen-
tial perspective. We say more about this in sect. .
 For our purposes these three schools comprise ‘ancient Greek ethics’. We recog-
nize, of course, that there were others. But only these three focus on agency in the
good life of the sort necessary to secure our argument.
 Sym.   –, trans.Nehamas andWoodruﬀ. See also   –: ‘every desire
for good things or for happiness is “the supreme and treacherous love” in everyone’.
In both passages ‘happiness’ translates eudaimonia.
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Philebus is based on the belief that ‘everything that has any notion
of [the good] hunts for it and desires to get hold of it and secure it
for its very own, caring nothing for anything else except for what
is connected with the acquisition of some good’ (Phileb.   –,
trans. Frede).
Aristotle’s ethical theorizing likewise depends on the claim that
is formulated as an explicit commitment in theNicomachean Ethics:
‘[H]appiness is among the things that are prized and complete. . . .
[I]t is for the sake of this that we all do everything else.’ That too
is about as explicit a formulation of PE as one might desire. Al-
though Aristotle does not make the idea explicit in his discussion
of voluntary and involuntary actions, PE is also at work in his ex-
ploration of the degree of voluntariness in actions adverse to one’s
own interests. Additionally, PE is implicit in the argument Aris-
totle oﬀers in theEudemian Ethics for identifying the normative aim
of life; this, he maintains, is ‘most diﬃcult’ when it comes to what
is desirable, what would satisfy our desire (EE . , b–,
trans. Solomon). Aristotle clearly supposes that the dominant de-
sire to live well is something common to, and descriptive of, ‘the
multitude’ (EE . , b).
Finally, PE is endorsed by the Stoics as well. Epictetus relies on
it to argue that one ‘cannot think a thing advantageous to him, and
not choose it’. PE is also key to the Stoic doctrine of ‘personal
oikeiōsis’. The core of this doctrine is that each of us is born with a
drive to seek what is good for us. The objects of this drive begin,
as we are children, with food and warmth; we start to use reason
to attain our objects, and eventually learn to treasure reason for its
own sake. On the Stoic view the good life just is the life according
to nature, so—since the ‘impulse’ given by nature occurs in each of
us—a form of PE lies in the background of the entire doctrine.
 Though this claim is framed as one about the desire for ‘the good’ (to agathon),
the context makes it clear that the good in question is a property of one’s life. The
good life is the quarry of the dialectic.
 NE . , a–, trans. D. O. Ross, rev. J. O. Urmson, in The Complete Works
of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J. Barnes,  vols. (Princeton, ).
All quotations from Aristotle come from this volume.
 e.g. throwing one’s valuables into the sea to avoid drowning in a storm (NE . ,
a).
 Epict. Diss. . . , in The Discourses of Epictetus. The Handbook. Fragments,
ed. C. Gill, trans. R. Hard (London, ).
 For ‘personal oikeiōsis’ see e.g. Cic. Fin. . ; . ; . ; . ; . . On the
good life as life according to nature see e.g. Fin. . ; . .
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This gets us to our central question, as to the warrant for PE itself
in these theories. PE is a descriptive claim about the psychology of
individual human beings. But there seems to have been no syste-
matic investigation of any empirical facts to sustain it, and though
its truistic nature goes some of the way to do so, it certainly doesn’t
rule out outliers as the Greeks seem to suppose it does. Can PE be
warranted as a genuinely universal claim? Can it also be true? Next
we lay out our strategy for arguing that it is both.
. Defending psychological eudaimonism
We propose that PE’s warrant arises from a transcendental claim
about the possibility of engaging in argument about how to
live and act. We have in mind a claim about the possibility of
‘interpretation’—of ascribing intentional mental states to those
with whom we engage in discourse. To see this let us begin by
making PE precise:
(PE) Each person has the desire to live well as a dominant ele-
ment in his or her psychological economy.
On our view, the ancients (and for that matter we ourselves) are
justiﬁed in asserting PE in virtue of the truth of a closely related
transcendental (T) presupposition of PE:
(TPE) If we are to ascribe rationality to someone, we must also
ascribe to him or her the desire to live well as a dominant
element in his or her psychological economy.
We must consider how TPE can supply warrant to PE. We do so
after two clariﬁcatory comments about it.
First, by ‘rationality’ we mean both theoretical and practical. At
stake is the possibility of engagement in argumentation about ac-
tion. The interpretation involved is as of another person capable of
assessing reasons for and against possible courses of conduct. Se-
cond, by speaking of a desire to live well as a ‘dominant element’
in the psychological economy of a person (which we shall hereafter
speak of as having the ‘dominant desire’), wemean two things speci-
ﬁcally. First, it must be motivationally powerful enough to be called
upon to provide suﬃcient motivation to overwhelm competing mo-
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tivations. Second, it must be stable and enduring enough to be
called upon over time and throughout the process of habituation.
Now TPE, as a transcendental claim as to the very possibility of
interpreting another as rational, turns out to be both necessary and
normative. It is necessary because (we shall argue) it applies in vir-
tue of our concept of rationality, correctly understood. It applies in
virtue of what rationality turns out (under reﬂective scrutiny) to be.
It is normative because it prescribes the conditions under which (we
shall argue) we may, and may not, appropriately ascribe rationality
to others.
PE, as a descriptive claim, is not the same as TPE’s consequent.
How can TPE warrant PE? TPE’s conclusion is a prescription: a
claim about what we must do if we are to interpret others as ra-
tional. TPE, if true, licenses an ascription of the dominant desire to
live well to anyone being interpreted as rational. And interpretation
as rational is necessary for anyone towhom argument is directed; we
could not understand ourselves as engaging in argument except that
we see those we engage as susceptible to the normative constraints
of rationality. This was true of Socrates and the ancient eudaimo-
nists, and it is true of us. The truth of TPE ensures that in any
context in which PE is deployed, its deployment will be warranted
in virtue of rationality of those to whom the argument is directed.
Would TPE secure the truth of PE? It must. PE makes a uni-
versal claim, about ‘each’ (and every) person. We can understand
TPE as making explicit the domain of that claim, such that it is in-
deed universally true. It speciﬁes that the domain of ‘persons’ for
the purposes of PE is all and only those beings we interpret as ra-
tional. If we take the antecedent of TPE to be ‘ﬁxing the domain’ of
persons in this way, then its truth guarantees the truth of PE also.
The question that will be before us for the rest of this paper is
whether TPE is true. Our argument that it is has two premisses.
Consider how things look to Socrates. First, to understand others
as rational generally, Socrates must interpret them as similar to
himself in his own rationality. He must see them as having a psy-
chological economy with beliefs, desires, and evaluative attitudes in
 When we speak of a ‘desire’, we mean only an attitude characterized by mo-
tivational valence (attraction or aversion). We remain neutral on whether we desire
only what we judge to be the good. See R. Kamtekar, ‘Plato on the Attribution of
Conative Attitudes’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), –, for an
argument that in attributing such conative attitudes to others we must see them as
aiming at the good.
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the relevant respects like his own—as having the intentional states
that he would have were he in their place. So must we. This is tan-
tamount toDavidson’s argument for the charity constraint on inter-
pretation. Call this premiss ‘Davidson’s Principle of Interpretation’
(‘DPI’):
(DPI) We can interpret others as rational only by ascribing to
them intentional states that we would have were we in
their place.
DPI implies that we can fail to see others’ practical agency as like
our own only on pain of ceasing to see them as rational. Second,
Socrates could not understand himself as (speciﬁcally) practically
rational without the dominant desire to live well. Neither can we.
This comes from what we call the ‘Eudaimonist Principle of Ratio-
nality’ (‘EPR’):
(EPR) The dominant desire to live well is essential to under-
standing ourselves as practically rational.
By ‘essential’ we mean that we could neither be practically rational
nor understand ourselves to be practically rational without it; this
is something we discover when we reﬂect on what living well con-
sists in, and in particular consider the role of virtue and successful
practical rationality (practical wisdom) in living well. Because the
dominant desire to live well is essential to understanding ourselves
as practically rational, it is essential to our intentional states overall.
Hence DPI tells Socrates that to understand others as rational he
must consider what his own intentional states would be in the re-
levant situation and project them outward. EPR tells Socrates that
his own intentional states must contain the dominant desire to live
well. Now if Socrates can interpret others as rational only by ascrib-
ing to them intentional states that he would have were he in their
shoes, and the dominant desire to live well is essential to his under-
standing of himself as practically rational and so essential to his own
intentional states, then Socrates must ascribe this desire to them as
well on pain of ceasing to see them as rational.
Wemay think of DPI as providing the form that interpretation of
others as rational must take (roughly, our own), while EPR provides
the content of practical rationality in particular (crucially, including
the dominant desire to live well). DPI by itself does not establish
that speakers share any speciﬁc desire, let alone the dominant de-
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sire to live well. Davidson himself acknowledges as much.Nor do
the ancient eudaimonists claim that it is conceptually impossible
for rational beings in abstracto to lack the dominant desire to live
well. Their commitment to EPR is a commitment to how we are
to understand ourselves. Though we can understand others on the
model of ourselves, nothing about EPR sanctions the conclusion
that it is impossible to do otherwise. That is why DPI and EPR are
both needed to ensure the truth of TPE. And if TPE is true, then
the truth of PE follows.
Now we do not claim that Socrates (or anyone else) consciously
appliesDPI or EPR to others when attempting to understand them.
Our point instead is that we as theorists necessarily could recover
from any agent’s acts both DPI and EPR as principles constitutive
of how that agent understands the acts of others. The theoretical
ascription of DPI and EPR to an agent, even if the agent is not her-
self consciously guided by them, is the only means by which we
could understand how one agent can in principle make sense of an-
other. In the next two sections we rehearse DPI, EPR, and their
conclusion.
. Donald Davidson on interpretation
Davidson’s canonical work on interpretation begins, ‘What is it for
words to mean what they do?’ He answers in two stages. First,
Davidson argues that words mean what they do in virtue of their
role in a speaker’s sentences, and those sentences mean what they
do in virtue of the meaning that would be assigned to them by a ra-
dical interpreter. The radical interpreter, in turn, assumes nothing
 SeeDavidson, ‘The Interpersonal Comparison of Values’, inProblems of Ratio-
nality [Problems] (Oxford, ), – at . His expositors agree. See B. Martin,
‘The Moral Atmosphere: Language and Value in Davidson’, Southwest Philosophy
Review,  (), –, and ‘Interpretation and Responsibility: Excavating Dav-
idson’s Ethical Theory’, in Hahn (ed.), Davidson, –; C. Rovane, ‘On the Very
Idea of an Ethical Scheme’, Iyyun,  (), –; andD.Caldwell, ‘The Shared-
Value Thesis’, Southwest Philosophy Review,  (), –.
 D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation [Inquiries] (Oxford,
), xiii.
 The ﬁrst stage is constituted especially by Inquiries, essays –, –, and Sub-
jective, Intersubjective, Objective [Subjective] (Oxford, ), essay ; the second, by
Problems, essays –, and Truth and Predication (Harvard, ), chs. –. Our ac-
count of these is necessarily limited. For other accounts speciﬁcally of the ﬁrst, see
N. Goldberg, ‘Tension within Triangulation’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
(), –, and ‘Triangulation, Untranslatability, and Reconciliation’, Philo-
sophia,  (), –.
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about what a speaker’s words mean. Instead, she determines what
they mean by constructing a charitable, Tarski-style truth theory
for the speaker’s language. In virtue of being a Tarski-style truth
theory, the theory systematically correlates a speaker’s utterances
with conditions under which each is true. In virtue of being char-
itable, the theory requires that the interpreter make these truth-
value assignments given what she herself would believe were she in
the speaker’s place.
Because the charity condition is central to our argument, it re-
quires elaboration. According to Davidson, what a speaker utters
(at least in basic cases) depends on both what she takes her words
to mean and what she believes about her environment. The only
way in which a radical interpreter can make the requisite truth-
value assignments in these basic cases that will allow her to solve
for meaning is if she holds the content of the speaker’s beliefs con-
stant, as far as possible. Davidson’s proposal is that the interpreter
do so by taking those beliefs, as far as possible, to be true. Now, that
is true as taken by the interpreter. According toDavidson, interpre-
tation can proceed only if the interpreter ascribes to the speaker as
much as she can beliefs that she herself would have were she in the
speaker’s spot.
Suppose the radical interpreter observes a speaker utter ‘Lah’
when and only when it is snowing. Unless the interpreter ascribes
to the speaker the belief that it is snowing (which the interpreter
herself would have were she in the speaker’s place), she has no rea-
son to interpret ‘Lah’ to mean that it is snowing. Without assuming
that the speaker believes things that the interpreter herself would,
the interpreter has no reason not to take the speaker to mean that it
is raining, that it is sunny, that boulders are falling from the sky, or
anything else. Further, Davidson stresses, beliefs can themselves be
ascribed only against a network of related beliefs. And these related
beliefs, like the initial ones, are drawn from the interpreter’s own
potential stock. Unless the interpreter also ascribes to the speaker
beliefs like these—that snow falls from the sky and can accumulate
on the ground, that snow is distinct from dirt, etc. (which the in-
terpreter would also believe in the speaker’s situation)—she is not
entitled to interpret ‘Lah’ to mean it is snowing, either. In fact,
 See Davidson, ‘Moods and Performance’, in Inquiries, –, for utterances
that are not statements.
 Such cases, for Davidson, are presumably determined via trial and error.
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without believing these (and other) things about snow, the speaker
cannot be taken to believe anything about snow. ‘The reason for
this’, Davidson explains,
is that a belief is identiﬁed by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this
pattern that determines the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is
about. Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the
subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs
about the subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine the identiﬁcation
of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of descriptions
of the belief as being about the subject.
Truth or falsity, that is, by the interpreter’s lights.
Now Davidson counsels two caveats. First, when the radical in-
terpreter interprets a speaker’s utterances, she may occasionally
have to ascribe to the speaker beliefs that the interpreter would re-
gard as false. Suppose the interpreter produces a truth theory ac-
cording to which, when and only when it is snowing, the speaker
utters something that means that it is raining. The charitability
condition would require the interpreter to revisit her initial belief
ascription to avoid taking the speaker to say things that, when and
only when it is raining, mean that it is snowing. (Perhaps the in-
terpreter would now ascribe the belief that snow is a kind of ubi-
quitous moisture that only sometimes forms ﬂakes.) The best way
overall for the interpreter to ascribe her own beliefs to the speaker
is occasionally to ascribe beliefs that the interpreter herself would
lack were situations switched.
Davidson’s second caveat is that interpretation is indeterminate.
There will always be more than one way to interpret a speaker’s
utterances, because there will always be more than one belief to
ascribe to any speaker given any situation. We saw that above with
ascribing beliefs about snow and rain. None the less, indetermi-
nacy or not, interpreters aim for a theory that best reconciles charity
with the formal conditions of a Tarski-style truth theory. ‘Nothing
more is possible, and nothing more is needed’ to determine what
a speaker’s words mean.
Desires come in the second stage of Davidson’s work on interpre-
tation. The radical interpreter this time begins by isolating utter-
ances that the speaker prefers to be true, for Davidson argues that
 Davidson, ‘Thought and Talk’, in Inquiries, – at .
 Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Inquiries, –
at .
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a speaker’s preferences are determined by her beliefs and desires
together. The interpreter now begins by charitably ascribing be-
liefs and desires to determine what those words mean. She takes
her speaker to believe what is true (by her lights) and desire what
is good (by her lights) too.
Suppose the radical interpreter observes a speaker utter ‘Jitwat
ugum’ and point at a bowl of sugar when and only when presented
with a bowl of sugar and one of salt. Because, for Davidson, pre-
ferences resolve into beliefs and desires, the interpreter must (as
far as possible) hold both constant to solve for meaning. Davidson’s
proposal is to do so by ascribing to the speaker (as far as possible)
beliefs and desires together that the interpreter would have were she
in the speaker’s place. Unless the interpreter ascribes to the speaker
(a) the belief that she is being presented with a bowl of sugar and
one of salt, and that she is pointing at the former, and (b) the desire
to have sugar over salt, she is not entitled to interpret ‘Jitwat ugum’
to mean that I (the speaker) prefer(s) sugar over salt, or something
like it. Moreover, unless the interpreter also ascribes to the speaker
desires like these—to have sugar over nothing, to have others pay
attention to one’s gesticulations, etc. (which the interpreter would
desire also in the speaker’s place)—she is unjustiﬁed in interpreting
‘Jitwat ugum’ to mean that I (the speaker) prefer(s) sugar over salt,
or something like it, either. Desires can be ascribed only against a
network of desires. In fact Davidson maintains that beliefs and de-
sires can be ascribed only collectively against a network composed
of both. And ascriptions of both would, again, derive from the in-
terpreter’s self-reﬂection. Finally, these assumptions on hand, the
interpreter can take ‘Jitwat ugum’ to mean that I (the speaker) pre-
fer(s) sugar over salt. And that is enough, according to Davidson,
for it to have that meaning.
Now all this is radical interpretation. The radical interpreter,
however, is meant to be an idealized version of us. In practice we
all assume much about the meaning of a speaker’s words; none of
us constructs a charitable, Tarski-style truth theory for a speaker’s
language. But in principle, according toDavidson, we all could. Re-
ﬂecting on the procedure of the radical interpreter ismeant to reveal
 See N. Goldberg, ‘Swampman, Response-Dependence, and Meaning’, in G.
Preyer (ed.),Davidson’s Philosophy: Truth, Meaning, and theMental (Oxford, forth-
coming), forwhy this commitsDavidson to a response-dependence account ofmean-
ing.
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how belief, desire, meaning, and truth can generally be teased out
of speaker preferences and interpreter assumptions.
To see this, consider Andrea, a hard-working lawyer, devoted
wife, and dedicated mother. We observe Andrea saying things like:
(α) ‘I prefer getting to the oﬃce tomorrow earlier rather than
later.’
(β) ‘I prefer that my husband do the grocery shopping.’
(γ) ‘I prefer red over white wine with dinner.’
Of course, she says things that are not statements of her prefer-
ences; and some things that she says we don’t hear. But we do hear
these. Since we are not radical interpreters, we assume that An-
drea’s words mean the same as ours. But (and this is Davidson’s
point) if Andrea turned out to believe and desire things very diﬀer-
ent from what we would in her place, we would have no warrant to
assume that we knew anything about what her words mean. What
entitles us to interpret (α) to mean that I (she) prefer(s) getting to
the oﬃce tomorrow earlier rather than later is that we take Andrea
to believe and desire generally what we would in her place, includ-
ing, perhaps, the belief that it makes more sense to get there earlier
and the desire to do what makes more sense. We can interpret (β) to
mean that I (she) prefer(s) that my (her) husband does the grocery
shopping only if we again ascribe to her beliefs and desires that we
ourselves would have were we in her spot, perhaps this time includ-
ing the belief that it would be better for him to do the shopping and
the desire to do what is better. We can interpret (γ) to mean that I
(she) prefer(s) red over white wine with dinner only if we ascribe
to her what we would believe, maybe that either kind of wine is
optional, and what we would desire, maybe to enjoy what I (she)
drink(s). Hence we are ascribing to Andrea the desires:
() to do what makes more sense;
() to do what is better;
() to enjoy what I drink.
Admittedly these are not the only desires that we could ascribe to
Andrea, on Davidson’s view. Even non-radical interpretation re-
tains an element of indeterminacy: we might ascribe to her diﬀer-
ent beliefs also and interpret her words to have diﬀerent meaning.
None the less, the diﬀerences are not limitless. Given our observa-
tions of Andrea, and our general ability tomake sense enough of her
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behaviour as our theory of what her words mean evolves, we would
not ascribe to her these desires:
(′) not to do what makes more sense;
(′) not do what is better;
(′) not to enjoy what I drink.
As interpreters we have no starting-point other than ourselves.
Consequently we have no better indicator of what someone else
would believe or desire in various situations than what we would.
And, given Andrea’s behaviour, (′)–(′) would not match our
conative state were we in her situation. We would therefore have
no reason to ascribe (′)–(′) to her.
Though we reserve judgement on much of Davidson’s proposal,
we agree that the onlyway inwhich an interpreter can assume (as we
do) or determine (as the radical interpreter does) what a speaker’s
words mean is by ascribing to the speaker the intentional states that
we would have were we in her situation—readjusting as necessary,
with an eye towards taking her overall mental stock to match what
would be ours.Hence regardless of howmuch or little an interpreter
assumes about what a speaker’s words mean, the interpreter has no
choice but to assume a great deal about what the speaker believes
and desires. In fact Davidson concludes:
A creature that cannot in principle be understood in terms of our own be-
liefs, values [or desires], and mode of communication is not a creature that
may have thoughts radically diﬀerent from our own; it is a creature without
what we mean by ‘thoughts’.
Therefore, we can interpret others as rational only by ascribing to
them intentional states that we would have were we in their place.
This is DPI.
. The dominant desire to live well and normative eudaimonism
SupposeDavidson is correct andDPI is true.Why should TPE fol-
low?Whymust Socrates (say) have the particular desire to live well,
let alone have it be dominant? The key is the role of the dominant
 Davidson, ‘Expressing Evaluations’, inProblems, – at  (emphasis added).
For Davidson’s use of this reasoning against conceptual relativity, see N. Goldberg,
‘E pluribus unum: Arguments against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content’,
Southern Journal of Philosophy,  (), –.
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desire to live well in Socrates’ apprehension of himself as practic-
ally rational. The key claim is what we have called the ‘Eudaimonist
Principle of Rationality’:
(EPR) The dominant desire to live well is essential to under-
standing ourselves as practically rational.
Here we adduce two arguments for EPR. The ﬁrst is found in Aris-
totle’s work on behalf of NE; the second in Plato’s.
Aristotle’s case in the opening chapters of theNicomachean Ethics
is that an ultimate end—one which lends reason-giving force to all
other ends and means to them, but which is given no reason-giving
force by any further end—is necessary tomake rational the economy
of end-seeking attitudes and conduct characteristic of the only prac-
tically rational beings we know, viz. ourselves. Seeing ourselves as
having such an end is essential to understanding ourselves as prac-
tically rational. Moreover, Aristotle (like Socrates, Plato, and the
Stoics) maintains that the only end suitable to that job is that of liv-
ing well (NE . , a). That is NE. Put diﬀerently, we have
many ﬁnal ends (ends we seek for their own sakes, not merely for
the sake of something further), but all our ﬁnal ends except the end
of living well we have partially for the sake of a further end, viz. the
end of living well. The ancients believe that an intelligible frame-
work of human practical rationality must take the form of a hier-
archy of ends, and the end that justiﬁes and regulates the normative
force of these others is the end of living well.
Why must there be a single end terminating all these chains
of means–end justiﬁcation? The answer depends both on what
practical rationality looks like for the ancients, and on our under-
standing of its being ﬁxed (as interpretation is) ineluctably in the
ﬁrst-person perspective of practical agency, rather than from the
third-personal perspective of observation or explanation.
Consider Annas’s response to the question. Annas claims that, in
supposing that we must converge on a single ultimate end, Aristotle
is being faithful to psychological fact, rather than making a point
about rationality. She observes that Aristotle even acknowledges
the existence of people who think that happiness is a ‘compound’
of several such ends, but then remarks:
These people, however, are presumably unreﬂective people who have not
yet thought through the implications of reﬂection on one’s life as a whole . . .
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it seems clear that they take it that one cannot consistently stop at two or
more ends if one is thinking of one’s life as a whole. Felt discomfort with the
idea of two or more uncoordinated ends will pressure the agent to continue
towards a single ﬁnal end.
Annas is right about ‘felt discomfort’, in particular in thinking
about one’s whole life, but we experience that discomfort precisely
because we are practically rational, and conditions in which there
is no ultimate end to adjudicate justiﬁcatory conﬂicts are condi-
tions in which practical rationality is impossible: our decision in
the face of such conﬂicts must be arbitrary. To have an end is,
inter alia, to accept normative constraints on the conditions under
which one is willing to pursue alternatives. Ends impose normative
constraints on those who can recognize them. Because we can make
sense of our lives as the lives of practically rational creatures only
by appreciating the role and force of ends from the ﬁrst-personal
perspective of agents whose ends they are, Aristotle’s claims about
the work of an ultimate end in our practical economies are rooted in
our appreciation of the normative dimensions of those economies.
Of course, his proposal is not that people operate with this end-
seeking structure consciously present to mind, let alone with what
Sarah Broadie calls ‘The Grand End’ in view. The structure is
normative, becoming explicit only in rational reﬂection. As Annas
reminds us, for the Greek theorists the aim of ‘ethical reﬂection’
was the concern to make one’s life as a whole a good one. Such re-
ﬂection does two things. First, in resolving the normative tensions
between our goals and aspirations, it renders determinate the nature
of the end of living well. If the ancients are right, reﬂection reveals
that virtue is at least necessary, if not also suﬃcient, for a good life.
Lives oriented towards pleasure, honour, or other candidate ulti-
mate ends do not withstand scrutiny. Second, the process of reﬂec-
tion makes manifest the fundamental justiﬁcatory work of the end
of living well in the life of the practically rational human being. No
other structure of ends can be stable against the sorts of demand to
which human practical rationality is subject.
Nevertheless, so much gets us only to the end, not the desire, of
 J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, ), . The passage in which
Aristotle remarks on those accepting a ‘compound’ is at EE . , b.
 For a defence of this claim seeM. LeBar,The Value of LivingWell [LivingWell]
(Oxford, forthcoming), chs. –.
 S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford, ), ch. .iv.
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living well, as essential to practical rationality. These do not, how-
ever, readily divorce—on the ancients’ views or on ours. For the
ancients, the dominant desire to live well plays an essential role in
the reﬂection that vindicates NE. First, its strength secures the end
of living well against countervailing motivations. Given the moti-
vation to act viciously in some way, and having grasped that vicious
conduct is in conﬂict with the end of living well because of the ne-
cessity of virtue for living well, one might consider the option of
giving up the end of living well. But given the contribution of vir-
tue to living well, the cost of subordinating the dominant desire to
live well to a desire to act viciously is a disavowal of the structure of
ends and means that shapes one’s reasons to act. The cost of doing
so is therefore to cease being practically wise.
Second, and more importantly, the desire is essential to the end
because of the relationship between desires and ends on the an-
cient ethical theories. Desires do not themselves establish ends, yet
ends involve normative constraints and not simply conative states.
A Kantian take on that point would be to say that desires require
being taken up or ‘incorporated’ through some process of rational
endorsement, but this isn’t quite adequate as a characterization
of the ancient approach. For such endorsement is only one of the
two ways in which desires and ends are connected. Desires do not
simply come unbidden.We bid them in virtue of the kinds of people
we make ourselves, through moral education and then habituation.
We cultivate the desires we endorse, and those we do not endorse we
attempt to extirpate by the same means. The natures we cultivate
are themselves the sources of desires we judge worth having.
From this perspective, the dominant desire to live well is one that
ethical reﬂection sustains as one we have good reason to cultivate,
suitable as an end. Because we desire it, we are motivated to pur-
sue it even when we would prefer not to. Because we endorse it, it
 Kant says: ‘Freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely pe-
culiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so
far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim’ (Kant, Religion within the
Boundaries ofMere Reason, . , trans. A.W.Wood andG. Di Giovanni, inReligion
and Rational Theology (Cambridge, )).
 A clear case of this view is contained in Socrates’ argument against Callicles
in Plato’s Gorgias. Socrates exerts considerable energy to drive Callicles, who is de-
fending the view that the best life is one of pleasure derived from satisfying desires,
to agree that there are both good desires and bad ( ﬀ.). Once that is granted, the
knowledge of which is which—and thus which we ought to seek to satisfy and which
not—takes normative priority.
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acquires not just conative but also normative force as an end that
guides and constrains our actions. In so acting we develop natures
that foster the perseverance of the desire. Our endorsement of the
dominant desire to live well gives us reason to cultivate it in life
and action, in part by gratifying it. The cost of lacking the domi-
nant desire to live well, conversely, would be tension between our
motivational propensities and the end we see as that for the sake of
which we do all that we do. Such tension would undermine a dis-
position to regulate one’s ends in a way that is stable under ethical
reﬂection. It would be a threat to a stable disposition to comply with
the demands of practical rationality itself.
A second argument for EPR comes from Plato’s work, and this
argument too (found also in Aristotle) binds the end and the de-
sire in the practically rational agent and hence conjoins EPR and
NE. The Greek eudaimonists argue for the end of living well as
our ultimate end by positing formal conditions on the ultimate end
that gives focus and structure to practical agency. The dominant
desire to live well is crucial for these conditions. The work it does
is most salient in the condition of suﬃciency (hikanon in Plato, or to
autarkes (‘self-suﬃciency’) in Aristotle). Our ultimate end, or good,
must be plausible as an object of desire, indeed of a sort of compre-
hensive desire that dominates one’s very life and agency. This line
of thought appears in Plato’s Philebus, where Socrates says:
Everything that has any notion of it hunts for [the good] and desires to get
hold of it and secure it for its very own, caring nothing for anything else
except for what is connected with the acquisition of some good. (Phileb.
  –)
Here the dominant desire to live well is not framed as clearly as in
Euthydemus, but the point is the same, for it is lives to which the test
of suﬃciency is applied. Socrates’ interlocutor Protarchus agrees
with Socrates that lives of pure pleasure and pure knowledge both
fail the test, in that neither is a ﬁt object of desire for human beings.
Only a ‘mixture’ of the two can be endorsed, precisely because the
alternatives do not satisfy our desire to live well. Self-suﬃciency as
a condition on our ultimate end does just the same work in Aris-
totle’s argument for NE in Nicomachean Ethics . . These ancient
arguments bind together the desire and the end. Responsiveness to
the dominant desire to live well plays a crucial role as a normative
constraint on what can count as our ultimate end. The dominant
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desire to live well does important work, not only in the moral psy-
chology of the virtuous agent, but also in the kind of philosophical
rationale the ancients oﬀered for their conceptions of the good life
for the practically rational agents we are.
Onemight wonder at this point whyDPI is needed to reach TPE,
if EPR by itself entails a rational requirement to desire to live well.
EPR is ultimately a principle about how we understand ourselves,
from the ﬁrst-personal perspective of practical agency. Though we
can understand others as practically rational by taking them to de-
sire to live well, nothing about EPR requires that we do so. Be-
cause EPR tells us that the dominant desire to live well is essential
to understanding ourselves as practically rational, it follows that the
same must be true if we are to understand others as practically ra-
tional on themodel of ourselves. DPI supports the crucial point that
that model is the only one available to us qua interpreters.
As illustration, reconsider the desires that we ascribed to Andrea:
() to do what makes more sense;
() to do what is better;
() to enjoy what I drink.
Recall that we ascribed ()–() instead of (′)–(′):
(′) not to do what makes more sense;
(′) not do what is better;
(′) not to enjoy what I drink
because DPI required that we do so. Now suppose that we were
Andrea, and we were asked why we uttered these:
(α) ‘I prefer getting to the oﬃce tomorrow earlier rather than
later.’
(β) ‘I prefer that my husband do the grocery shopping.’
(γ) ‘I prefer red over white wine with dinner.’
We would explain our goals or ends and, if pressed, arrive at a re-
ﬂective chain of deeper explanatory and justiﬁcatory ends.We want
to do what makes more sense when possible because we want to see
what we do as meaningful, perhaps. We want to do what is better
because we have the felt need to do what we think is right more
often than not. We want to drink the red wine because we like red.
Ancient eudaimonism is founded on the claim that once we have
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begun this chain of reﬂection, it can terminate only with the aim of
living well. That aimwould give us reason to do all we do, including
endorsing and acting upon desires like ()–() rather than (′)–(′).
That model of practical rationality is the only one available to us in
interpreting Andrea. We can make sense of Andrea’s desires as the
desires of a rational person only by seeing them as in a framework
in which the aim, and consequently the desire, to live well ‘stands
behind’ such subordinate desires. Only the conjunction of DPI and
EPR entitles us to interpret Andrea as having this desire. Only their
conjunction allows us to interpret her words and deeds in a way that
lets us make sense of her as practically rational.
Note that on our account of EPR practical rationality and our
self-understanding as practically rational converge. The picture of
practical rationality at work in the ancient eudaimonists is grounded
in the ﬁrst-personal perspective of agency, in which the experience
of seeking ends, and responding to the experience of their normative
constraints, is a familiar and irreducible part of practical agency.
Davidson grounds his own account of interpretation in just such
a ﬁrst-personal perspective, as evidenced by DPI. The interpreter
has no choice but to use her perspective as a starting-point to make
sense of others. That is why the two approaches are so congenial.
In fact, if the ancients’ approach is correct, we have reason to fa-
vour Davidson’s privileging of the ﬁrst-person agential (for him,
interpretative) perspective over any third-personal scientiﬁc per-
spective that more empirically minded philosophers might prefer.
When those such as Jerry Fodor think that identifying intentional
states in human beings will ultimately turn out to be as objective,
and so as amenable to third-person analysis, as identifying calcium
(say) in certain minerals, they fail to take seriously enough the ne-
cessarily normative nature of the intentional. Even if intentional
states in brains are as ‘Real’—to use Fodor’s emphatic term—as
 This is so even granted Davidson’s indeterminacy doctrine. While we would
not ascribe to Andrea (′), because given the circumstances we would not desire that
ourselves, we might ascribe to her this desire:
(″) to drink what is allegedly heart-healthier.
Suppose that we did. Through the same reﬂective chain of deeper explanatory and
justiﬁcatory ends we would desire this too because we desire to live well. Indeter-
minate or not, our ascription of rationality requires our ascription of the dominant
desire to live well.
 J. A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
(Cambridge, Mass., ).
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calcium is in certain minerals, their identiﬁcation cannot help but
appeal to the ﬁrst-person perspective of what the states should be,
given the interpretative circumstances. Normativity is part of our
notions of beliefs and desires: it ﬁnds its home in each of us qua
agents. That is why Davidson’s ﬁrst-person approach concerning
meaning and mind is so congenial when reﬂecting on questions the
ancients found fundamental, such as ‘What kind of life is best?’. It
is no coincidence that DPI and EPR can function in a single argu-
ment.
Still, we may doubt the truth of TPE, their conclusion.Must we
think that all people, at least in so far as we can recognize them as
practically rational, have the dominant desire to live well? We take
up this in our ﬁnal two sections.
. Objections: Kant
One challenge to TPE comes from Kant. On his view, practical ra-
tionality is characterized by autonomy, in governing ourselves by
self-legislated principles, rather than those imposed upon us by our
heteronomous natures. Kant thinks that this requires that we exer-
cise our wills in accordance with principles whose content is ﬁxed
formally, i.e. by the very idea of a principle drawing on no empir-
ical incentives for its content. This is his Categorical Imperative. Its
formal nature rules out any contribution from considerations rele-
vant to creatures living contingent, organic, biological lives as we
do, and thus oﬀers the prospect of a model of practical rationality
that can simply reject EPR and with it TPE.
Is this a reason for us to resist our argument for TPE? There are
two reasons why it is not. First, since Hegel, there has been concern
with this purely formal conception of practical rationality. If Kant
cannot pull the substantive rabbit out of the formal hat, then this is
no real alternative. Whether he can or not is a controversial ques-
tion, which we cannot even begin to address here. Our point instead
is that Kant’s conception has at least as much doubt attending to it
as either DPI or EPR.
Second, our argument for TPEmay survive even if Kant is right:
he may even count as a supporter. Kant holds that the ‘principle of
self-love’ is present in not just all human beings but all ‘dependent
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rational beings’. This principle is the imperative that they seek
their own ‘happiness’. Kant’s justiﬁcation for this claim is mysteri-
ous, by his lights, and indeed it is not easy to see what could ac-
count for its status as the ‘imperative’ he takes it to be. Christine
Korsgaard remarks that, in its nature as ‘substantial’ and notmerely
formal, it is a striking departure from the other imperatives Kant
frames in the Groundwork. Still, as she observes, it is ‘overwhelm-
ingly plausible to believe’ that there is such a rational requirement,
and Kant accepts it.
Now Kant’s conception of happiness is as ‘the sum of satisfac-
tion of all inclinations’ rather than as the eudaimonist desire to
live well, so this principle does not yet count as congruent with
TPE. However, the justiﬁcatory lacuna here signals that there is a
problemwith his conception. From the standpoint of eudaimonists,
Kant simply has not thought adequately about the rational order
needed for a ‘sum of satisfaction of desire’. Even if we think indi-
vidual desires convey normative force to their objects (something
Kant does not accept), there is nothing to convey normative force
to any principle that we should seek some ‘sum of satisfactions’
of them. They make conﬂicting demands on time, energy, and at-
tention, and normative assessment is required to adjudicate between
those competing demands. The ancients would have thought, and
we should agree, that such a systemmakes rational sense only on be-
ing reﬂected upon, shaped, and directed by the end of living well.
If so, thenKant’s conception of happiness is not stable on reﬂection,
and in reﬂective form—under the sort of reﬂective pressures that
the ancients believed we are under as practically rational agents—
collapses into congruence with TPE.
There is a further Davidsonian point to be made regarding
 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals . , trans. M. Gregor, in
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German–English Edition, ed. J.
Timmermann, trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge, ).
 Kant’s explanation is that it is an imperative by ‘natural necessity’: it belongs to
the ‘essence’ of ‘every human being’ (Groundwork . ); it represents an indirect
duty, he says, because of the temptation to ‘transgress duty’ if we do not seek our
own happiness (. ).
 However, shemakes no attempt to justify it within theKantian framework, des-
pite this admission (C. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity
(Oxford, ), § ..).  Groundwork . ; see also . .
 Again, this is precisely the point of Socrates’ argument against Callicles
in Gorgias. See M. LeBar, ‘Eudaimonist Autonomy’, American Philosophical
Quarterly,  (), –.
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Kant’s theory, one relevant to the prospects for ﬁnding a counter-
example to TPE. Kant is sceptical that we can ascribe even to
ourselves success in following the moral law as captured in the
Categorical Imperative. The eﬀects of material or empirical in-
centives are too pervasive in our practical lives for us to be sure
what principle is really governing our choice. A fortiori we are
never in a position to ascribe with certainty to others practical
rationality as modelled by the moral law. Instead we must ascribe
to them practical rationality as realized in ‘dependent’ creatures,
which, as we have seen, necessarily requires ascribing to them the
dominant desire to live well.
In fact Kant’s argument in both the Groundwork and later (e.g.
Metaphysics of Morals) supports DPI. The driving insight of that
principle is that we can understand others as rational only by de-
ploying the understanding we have of our own rational agency as
realized in our own intentional attitudes. Hence there is a commit-
ment to the explanatory primacy of the ﬁrst-person experience of
rational agency in both Davidson’s principle and Kant’s defence
of freedom and the moral law. Though Davidson’s argument is
driven by considerations drawn from the interpretation of beha-
viour, Davidson sees much of our ‘behaviour’ as intentional and
as states possible only for creatures subject to the canons of ratio-
nality. In a word, he sees much of our behaviour as action rather
than mere bodily movement. It is other beings, the speakers (hence
agents) about whom Davidson ubiquitously writes, who are the ul-
timate object of interpretation. Hence, for Davidson and Kant, if
we are to see others as practically rational, then we can do so only
by using the only model of practical rationality available to us: our
own, discovered in ﬁrst-personal practical agency.
. Objections: putative counter-examples
Thus Davidson’s constraints on interpretation, coupled with the
nature of practical rationality as revealed by the ancients, entail that
 Groundwork . .
 A divide on this focus exists among ancient ethical theories as well. The theor-
ies on which we focus—those of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics—all give a similar
primacy to the ﬁrst-person perspective of agency. Others—those of e.g. Epicurus,
the Cyrenaics, and the sceptical schools—do not, which explains in part our setting
them aside from our discussion.
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we must ascribe the dominant desire to live well to agents. We may
seem, however, to have no trouble imagining counter-examples. We
conclude by considering six putative counter-examples. Each takes
the form of an objection to TPE, which, if successful, invalidates
the move to PE.
(a) The immoral person
Can we make sense of immoral people, like the violent bank robber
who desires to kill the guard so that she can rob the vault, without
rejecting TPE?We can. As we have shown, TPE follows from DPI
and EPR. For our violent bank robber to ground an objection to
TPE, she would have to ground an objection to either DPI or EPR.
She does neither.
Consider EPR.Whilewe (probably) do not desire to kill the guard
so that we can rob the bank, if we did, we would best make sense of
ourselves as desiring this because we also desire to have money, to
have things that money can buy, to enjoy the things that money can
buy, and many others, all of which bottom out in our desire to live
well. We could take ourselves to desire to kill the guard only if we
understood that desire to be had in the service of the ultimate de-
sire to live well—even though as a matter of actual fact we probably
think that this is to misunderstand what living well requires. This is
of no consequence. Ancient ethical accounts are replete with cases
where the protagonist attempts to show that an interlocutor does
not have reason to do what he supposes he would like to do, simply
because correct beliefs about how to live well proscribe doing so.
The problem is the incorrect beliefs about what living well consists
in, not the motives for vicious action.
Might they be a problem for DPI? Were we to enter our neigh-
bourhood bank, we probably would not desire to kill the guard so
that we could rob the vault. How can we ascribe immoral desires
to the bank robber when (it is to be hoped) we would not ourselves
have them? Here Davidson is particularly helpful. We might count
robbery as irrational in so far as it violates the law and cheats people
out of hard-earned wealth. Davidson’s account entails that calling
someone ‘irrational’ makes sense only if we can ascribe to her a
background set of beliefs and desires that are themselves rational.
Recall his insight that false beliefs can be had only by agents who
generally have true ones. False beliefs must be inconsistent with
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truths that we hold or otherwise be irrational for us to hold given
that we take certain other propositions to be true. Davidson ex-
plains:
Inconsistency, or other forms of irrationality, can occur only within the
space of reasons; inconsistencies are perturbations of rationality, not mere
absence of rationality.
Just as beliefs can be occasionally false only if normally they are
true, persons can be occasionally irrational only if normally they
are rational. This is another way of putting Davidson’s earlier
point that a creature that cannot in principle be understood in
terms of our own beliefs is a creature without what we mean by
thoughts—where, according to Davidson, our beliefs must them-
selves be largely consistent lest they not be beliefs (for they would
lack content).
Now reconsider our violent bank robber. We have to ascribe to
her the belief that money is kept in banks, that guards employed
by banks if given the chance would try to thwart bank robbers,
even that guards once killed cannot thwart bank robbers, and so
on. These are all beliefs we would have and would have to ascribe
to the bank robber to make sense of her words and deeds. Likewise
we would have to ascribe to her aims such as having money, getting
money through violence, and having things that money can buy,
on grounds similar to those on which we ascribed justifying ends to
Andrea. Even though robbery might itself count as irrational, rob-
bers would overall be anything but, lest we be unable to interpret
what they mean or to regard them as possessing rational agency.
DPI holds as much for those acting immorally as for others. Since
EPR and DPI entail TPE, the case of the immoral person casts no
doubt on the truth of TPE.
(b) The self-destructive person
We can see in much the same light self-destructive people, includ-
ing in extremis the suicidal. They do not falsify TPE either, since
they too fail to falsify EPR or DPI. We can ourselves understand
how we might be pushed to various forms of self-destruction, even
if we in fact are not. As plausible a hypothesis as any is that the
motivation to end one’s life comes from the (perceived) frustration
 Davidson, Subjective, .
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of the dominant desire to live well. Because one believes that living
well in the future is impossible, one is motivated to terminate one’s
life now.We can imagine lesser forms of self-destruction as driven
by the dominant desire to live well too. Self-destructive tendencies
pose no problem for EPR.
Nor do they for DPI. Even if we don’t have the desire to harm
ourselves, we can ascribe that desire to others only if we can ﬁt it
into an otherwise rational pattern of beliefs and desires. Only by
ascribing to the self-destructive person a background of beliefs and
desires that make her come out as rational can we make sense of her
as desiring to harm herself at all. Only by ﬁrst imagining that her
intentional states approximate what ours would be were we in her
shoes, and then readjusting as necessary to make sense of her as ra-
tional overall, can we ascribe to her the desire for self-harm. EPR
and DPI remain true, and so does TPE.
(c) The extremely altruistic person
Stephen Darwall has suggested a diﬀerent sort of case. Consider
Sheila, who is motivated to seek the well-being or welfare of others,
without seeing her own well-being as reason-giving for her. Dar-
wall’s aim is to support the idea that the notion of rational care is
conceptually prior to that of welfare or well-being. Thus one could
be practically rational, indeed commendably morally (beneﬁcently)
motivated, without any desire to live well. If Sheila is intelligible—
if we can interpret her as rational—then TPE is in trouble.
Now, as we read him,Darwall isn’t claiming thatwe ourselves have
 Though we are unlikely to call Socrates ‘suicidal’, this is precisely the principle
behind his willingness to accept the verdict of the people of Athens and go will-
ingly to his execution. (See Crito  –, and see further Socrates’ claim at Gorg.
 – that it is how well one lives, not how long one lives, that matters.) More
generally, Stoic doctrine was explicit that suicide can be appropriate when living
longer is not conducive to living well. See e.g. Cic. Fin. . ; D.L. . , in A. A.
Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers,  vols. (Cambridge, ), i,
§ ; and Stobaeus m in B. Inwood and L. Gerson (eds.),Hellenistic Philosophy:
Introductory Readings (Cambridge, ), § -.
 S. Darwall,Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton, ),  ﬀ. A similar claim
is made by R. Kraut, though within the context of a diﬀerent theory, in What is
Good and Why (Harvard, ),  ﬀ. The details of a response on behalf of TPE
to Kraut’s view will diﬀer somewhat from those relevant to Darwall, but the main
concern is the same. For discussion see M. LeBar, ‘Development and Reasons: Re-
view of Richard Kraut’sWhat is Good andWhy’, Philosophical Quarterly,  (),
–, and Living Well, ch. . For a Kantian attack on the practical rationality of
someone like Sheila, see J. Hampton, ‘Selﬂessness and Loss of Self ’, Social Philo-
sophy and Policy,  (), –.
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Sheila’s mindset, only that someone could. So he is challenging that
our experience generalizes. That is a challenge to DPI. But the idea
behind TPE is also at work here in so far as DPI licenses our ap-
plication of EPR to others. One way to understand Sheila is to see
her as thinking a life devoted to the welfare of others just is the life
most worth living for her. Whether or not we agree, such a notion is
intelligible. It is also compatible with TPE, since devoting her life
to others is the form that Sheila sees the satisfaction of her desire to
live well must take. DPI would therefore license our taking EPR to
apply to her.
Consider the options. On the other hand, in so far as we refrain
from ascribing to her a dominant desire to live well, we struggle to
understand how to see Sheila as rational at all. There either is or
is not a point to her commitment to the welfare of others. If there
is, and we ask Sheila what that point might be, then Sheila will be
capable of rendering her thinking in a form that we can interpret
as rational only to the extent that we can embed her aim within a
framework of ends which takes its rational structure from the aim
of living well. This requires the dominant desire to live well as part
of her psychological economy. Seeing Sheila as rational forces us
to ascribe to her a justiﬁcatory structure for her ends in which the
dominant desire to live well is essential, just as it is in our own. DPI
and with it TPE are vindicated. On the other hand, if there is not
a point to Sheila’s commitment to the welfare of others, then we
simply can’t interpret her as rational. Sheila turns out not to be an
altruistic person in any robust sense, for acting altruistically requires
acting on reasons.
Can Sheila simply insist, ‘Of course what I do has a point. Its
point is to increase the well-being of others’? If so, Sheila is com-
mitted to seeing the well-being of some people, but not others, as
by their nature reason-giving. That sort of arbitrariness renders her
unintelligible to us, so this reply is unavailable. Regardless, even if
Sheila has no reasons (since her behaviour has no point), this does
not falsify TPE. For even those who are thus pathological fail to
falsify TPE, as we show next.
(d) The pathological person
Darwall means Sheila to be an altruistic person, and so to act on
reasons. But what should we say about Sheldon—who, like Sheila
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on the pathological interpretation, does not desire to live well, but
(unlike her) exhibits outright self-destructive tendencies that ma-
nifest some deep psychosis? It is not that Sheila (as here imagined)
or Sheldon act out of the wrong reasons; it is that, properly speak-
ing, they are not acting out of any reasons. Both are non-rational in
the sense of being beyond the reach of rational discourse. They are
both pathological. It just so happens that Sheila’s pathology causes
her to behave in ways consistent with altruism; Sheldon’s, with self-
destruction.
This turns out to be just where TPE has its bite. To the extent
that we cannot see such human beings as wanting to live well as
we do (EPR), which as essential to our own intentional states is re-
quired for us to see them as rational (DPI), we cannot see them as
rational (TPE). Conversely, TPE claims that if we are to ascribe
rationality to someone, we must also ascribe to him or her the do-
minant desire to live well. But then, by contrapositive reasoning, if
we cannot ascribe to someone that desire, then we cannot ascribe
rationality to her in the ﬁrst place. TPE still turns out to be true.
Put diﬀerently, TPE is compatible with there being outliers:
human beings lacking the dominant desire to live a good life. But
it follows from our argument that our relationships with such
people cannot be the normal case of engagement with each other
as practically rational agents. Such cases drive our practices of
institutionalization and other forms of care for those missing es-
sential components of practical rationality. Sheila and Sheldon
both require our help but not in the form of rational counsel. EPR,
DPI, and TPE are unaﬀected.
(e) The akratic person
Not everyone who fails to be motivated by the dominant desire to
live well is pathological, however. Everyone, ourselves included, oc-
casionally suﬀers from akrasia or weakness of the will. But then we
would seem not to be required to ascribe the dominant desire to
live well to all people, at least not all of the time. Does that falsify
TPE?
It does not. Consider the case of ourselves being akratic. Even
though we think that we should exercise tonight rather than watch
reruns on television, we simply cannot get ourselves oﬀ the couch.
We are therefore not in this instance living well—and we know it.
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Yet for us to be akratic in the ﬁrst place, we must in the normal
course of events act in a way that is not akratic. We cannot have
weak wills unless we have wills—capacities that order our desire-
set in such a way as to make us practically rational. And we argued
above that the only way in which we could be so rational is if the
desire to live well dominates that set. That was the ancient justiﬁ-
cation for EPR, and akrasia does nothing to discount it.
There is a Davidsonian correlate to this point. Davidson rightly
claims that inconsistency and other forms of irrationality can oc-
cur only within the space of reasons. Our actions can themselves,
therefore, be occasionally inconsistent or irrational only if gener-
ally they are not. Since being akratic is a way of being irrational,
we can be akratic only occasionally if we are to be akratic at all. On
this ﬁrst-person analysis of akrasia, the ancients’ and Davidson’s
conclusions converge.
Now if these considerations are true in our own case, then they
are certainly true in the case of others. Not only EPR but DPI itself
then survives this alleged counter-example. For we can understand
others as suﬀering from weakness of the will only if we can under-
stand them as having wills, which requires our projecting EPR onto
them via DPI. Just as we must desire to live well lest we cannot
be practically rational, we must take others to desire this also lest
we cannot take them to be practically rational. The only way that
akrasia can be seen as a general phenomenon is if we ascribe inten-
tional states to others that wewould havewerewe in their situations.
DPI remains true.
Moreover, if Davidson is right that we can be akratic only occa-
sionally if we are to be akratic at all, then we can ascribe akrasia to
someone else only occasionally if we are to ascribe akrasia to her at
all. This further supports DPI.
Still, how is akrasia even possible on our view if the desire to
live well is meant to be dominant? Recall that by ‘dominant desire’
we mean, inter alia, a desire that would be called upon to provide
suﬃcient motivation to overwhelm competing motivations. In the
akratic’s case the call simply goes unheeded. Davidson is right to
allow occasional ‘perturbations of rationality’ to exist within an
otherwise rational framework. Our notion of dominant desire must
not preclude the possibility of such perturbations, and we were
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careful when deﬁning ‘dominant desire’ above to make sure that
it does not.
(f) Mixed cases
Some persons, on diﬀerent occasions or even on the same occasion,
exhibit more than one of the traits exempliﬁed by the alleged de-
featers of the sorts we have considered. People are complicated, and
our account must say something about this. Because there are many
possible mixed cases, we shall focus on one in particular. Though
the case is ﬁctive, the ancients take it quite seriously; so does Annas.
We have in mind Euripides’ Medea.
Medea, daughter of King Aeëtes of Colchis, comes to Jason’s aid
when the king commands that Jason retrieve the Golden Fleece.
None the less Medea overplays her hand, kills the king’s uncle, and
forces Jason and their two children to ﬂee with her to Corinth. Once
in Corinth Jason forsakesMedea and her children andmarriesKing
Creon’s daughter. Medea in her fury laments: ‘I know that what I
am about to do is bad, but anger is master of my plans, which is the
source of the greatest troubles for humankind.’ She then kills the
king and his daughter, as well as—and of particular importance to
us—her own children.
Annas observes two ways to think about Medea’s infanticide.
Epictetus thinks that anger masters Medea’s plans by pushing her
to accept infanticide as the correct act. He takes Medea to have
made an ultimately reasoned (albeit manifestly incorrect) judge-
ment that killing them would be the best way to wreak revenge on
her husband and spare her children ridicule. So understood,Medea
turns out to be an instance of the case of the immoral person who
desires to live well but mistakes what living well consists in. Our
reasoning concerning the immoral person then applies here too.
Although—it is to be hoped—we would not desire to commit in-
fanticide to wreak revenge and avoid ridicule, if we did, we would
 Of course, both the ancients and Davidson themselves analyse akrasia. On the
latter see ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’.
 J. Annas (ed. and comm.),Voices of Ancient Philosophy: An Introductory Reader
[Voices] (Oxford, ), –, which prints Eur.Med. –, as well as relevant
passages from Epictetus and Galen (see below).
 From Annas, Voices, .
 Epict. Diss. . . –; . . –, printed in Annas, Voices, –. G.
Rudebusch, Socrates (Malden, Mass., ), –, among those who pointed us
to Medea, generally agrees with Epictectus’ interpretation.
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best make sense of ourselves as desiring this because we ultimately
desired to live well. We can make sense of Medea’s being driven by
revenge and the desire to spare her children ridicule only if we can
make sense ofMedea’s havingmany other intentional states—states
we would have were we in her situation.
So understood, Medea turns out not to be a mixed case at all,
and unproblematic for reasons we have already considered. But An-
nas observes that there is another way to understand Medea. Ga-
len takes Medea to be torn between reason and anger, where anger
‘dragged her by force forward towards the children—and back again
reason pulled her and led her away, and then again anger pulled
against this, and then again reason’. On Galen’s view, reason and
anger take turns controlling Medea until anger ultimately wins.
Medea’s ﬁnal act cannot be seen as practically rational in any sense,
misguided or otherwise. Galen ﬁnds Medea’s case mixed between
what we might consider the normal one of someone who desires to
live well and is thereby motivated by that desire, and the patholo-
gical one of someone whom it makes no sense to count as practically
rational—precisely because it makes no sense to see her, at least in
certain instances, as desiring to live well. Medea is, as Galen puts
it, ‘dragged and pulled’, her pathology ultimately victorious. She is
therefore in the end non-rational, beyond the reach of rational dis-
course; she has gone mad with rage. It is not that she acts out of
the wrong reasons; it is that, ultimately, she is not acting out of any
reasons.
On this interpretation too there is no problem for TPE. As we
have seen, neither the normal nor the pathological case individu-
ally falsiﬁes EPR,DPI, or therefore TPE. But can our view account
for the possibility of someone who alternates between normality and
pathology—between, that is, rationality and non-rationality?
The idea of someone’s alternating between rationality and non-
rationality amounts to the idea of someone being ascribable with
the dominant desire to live well at some moments but not others.
An example might be Alzheimer’s suﬀerers, whom we describe as
having ‘good’ days and ‘bad’ days, where, we take it, these are short-
hand for days on which we can engage them rationally and those on
which we cannot. Correspondingly, we either treat such people as
(momentarily) rational, hence as having a dominating desire to live
well, or we do not treat them (momentarily) as rational at all. When
 Galen, PHP . . –, printed in Annas, Voices, –.
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we do not knowwhether they are capable of rational self-regulation,
we do not know whether argument about what to do is appropriate.
Our argumentative resources for engaging them as persons with the
capacity to respond to reason draw on shared attitudes (DPI), in-
cluding the dominant desire to live well (EPR). It is simply a fact
of life that sometimes we can do this, sometimes not.
Admittedly the case of Medea—and other mixed cases that space
prevents our considering—are hard. They should be. When it is
unclear to what degree someone is better helped by institutionali-
zation than rational discourse philosophy simply struggles. But so
do psychology, literary analysis (why else would Medea receive so
much attention among the ancients?), history, and the rest of those
disciplines tasked with making sense of the human.
Viewed in this light,Medea turns out to be not somuch a counter-
example as a reminder that the contours of rationality defy easy de-
ﬁnition. But her case does nothing to detract from our argument
that considerations of charity in interpretation, and NE in practical
rationality, demonstrate that we would be unable to ascribe ratio-
nality to anyone without ascribing to her the dominant desire to live
well. It would be impossible for us to count as a person anyone to
whom we would not ascribe that desire, and possible to count as a
person only those to whom we would. We conclude that PE is true:
each person has the desire to live well as a dominant element in his
or her psychological economy.
Ohio University—Washington and Lee University
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